In a variety of behavioral tasks, subjects exhibit an automatic and apparently sub-optimal sequential effect: they respond more rapidly and accurately to a stimulus if it reinforces a local pattern in stimulus history, such as a string of repetitions or alternations, compared to when it violates such a pattern. This is often the case even if the local trends arise by chance in the context of a randomized design, such that stimulus history has no predictive power. In this work, we use a normative Bayesian framework to examine the hypothesis that such idiosyncrasies may reflect the inadvertent engagement of fundamental mechanisms critical for adapting to changing statistics in the natural environment. We show that prior belief in non-stationarity can induce experimentally observed sequential effects in an otherwise Bayes-optimal algorithm. The Bayesian algorithm is shown to be well approximated by linear-exponential filtering of past observations, a feature also apparent in the behavioral data.

Across a wide range of cognitive tasks, recent experience influences behavior. For example, when individuals repeatedly perform a simple two-alternative forced-choice task (2AFC), response latencies vary dramatically based on the immediately preceding trial sequence. These sequential effects have been interpreted as adaptation to the statistical structure of an uncertain, changing environment (e.g. The Dynamic Belief Model (DBM) (Yu & Cohen, 2008) explains sequential effects in 2AFC tasks as a rational consequence of a dynamic internal representation that tracks second-order statistics of the trial sequence (repetition rates) and predicts whether the upcoming trial will be a repetition or an alternation of the previous trial. Experimental results suggest that first-order statistics (base rates) also influence sequential effects.

In a variety of behavioral tasks, subjects exhibit an automatic and apparently sub-optimal sequential effect: they respond more rapidly and accurately to a stimulus if it reinforces a local pattern in stimulus history, such as a string of repetitions or alternations, compared to when it violates such a pattern. This is often the case even if the local trends arise by chance in the context of a randomized design, such that stimulus history has no predictive power. In this work, we use a normative Bayesian framework to examine the hypothesis that such idiosyncrasies may reflect the inadvertent engagement of fundamental mechanisms critical for adapting to changing statistics in the natural environment. We show that prior belief in non-stationarity can induce experimentally observed sequential effects in an otherwise Bayes-optimal algorithm. The Bayesian algorithm is shown to be well approximated by linear-exponential filtering of past observations, a feature also apparent in the behavioral data.

For over half a century, psychologists have been struck by how poor people are at expressing their internal sensations, impressions, and evaluations via rating scales. When individuals make judgments, they are incapable of using an absolute rating scale, and instead rely on reference points from recent experience. This relativity of judgment limits the usefulness of responses provided by individuals to surveys, questionnaires, and evaluation forms. Fortunately, the cognitive processes that transform internal states to responses are not simply noisy, but rather are influenced by recent experience in a lawful manner. We explore techniques to remove sequential dependencies, and thereby decontaminate a series of ratings to obtain more meaningful human judgments. In our formulation, decontamination is fundamentally a problem of inferring latent states (internal sensations) which, because of the relativity of judgment, have temporal dependencies. We propose a decontamination solution using a conditional random field with constraints motivated by psychological theories of relative judgment. Our exploration of decontamination models is supported by two experiments we conducted to obtain ground-truth rating data on a simple length estimation task. Our decontamination techniques yield an over 20% reduction in the error of human judgments.

In most cognitive and motor tasks, speed-accuracy tradeoffs are observed: Individuals can respond slowly and accurately, or quickly yet be prone to errors. Control mechanisms governing the initiation of behavioral responses are sensitive not only to task instructions and the stimulus being processed, but also to the recent stimulus history. When stimuli can be characterized on an easy-hard dimension (e.g., word frequency in a naming task), items preceded by easy trials are responded to more quickly, and with more errors, than items preceded by hard trials. We propose a rationally motivated mathematical model of this sequential adaptation of control, based on a diffusion model of the decision process in which difficulty corresponds to the drift rate for the correct response. The model assumes that responding is based on the posterior distribution over which response is correct, conditioned on the accumulated evidence. We derive this posterior as a function of the drift rate, and show that higher estimates of the drift rate lead to (normatively) faster responding. Trial-by-trial tracking of difficulty thus leads to sequential effects in speed and accuracy. Simulations show the model explains a variety of phenomena in human speeded decision making. We argue this passive statistical mechanism provides a more elegant and parsimonious account than extant theories based on elaborate control structures.

Across a wide range of cognitive tasks, recent experience influences behavior. For example, when individuals repeatedly perform a simple two-alternative forcedchoice task(2AFC), response latencies vary dramatically based on the immediately preceding trial sequence. These sequential effects have been interpreted as adaptation to the statistical structure of an uncertain, changing environment (e.g., Jones and Sieck, 2003; Mozer, Kinoshita, and Shettel, 2007; Yu and Cohen, 2008).The Dynamic Belief Model (DBM) (Yu and Cohen, 2008) explains sequential effects in 2AFC tasks as a rational consequence of a dynamic internal representation that tracks second-order statistics of the trial sequence (repetition rates) and predicts whether the upcoming trial will be a repetition or an alternation ofthe previous trial. Experimental results suggest that first-order statistics (base rates) also influence sequential effects. We propose a model that learns both first-and second-order sequence properties, each according to the basic principles ofthe DBM but under a unified inferential framework. This model, the Dynamic BeliefMixture Model (DBM2), obtains precise, parsimonious fits to data. Furthermore, the model predicts dissociations in behavioral (Maloney, Martello, Sahm, and Spillmann, 2005) and electrophysiological studies (Jentzsch and Sommer, 2002),supporting the psychological and neurobiological reality of its two components.

In a variety of behavioral tasks, subjects exhibit an automatic and apparently sub-optimal sequential effect: they respond more rapidly and accurately to a stimulus if it reinforces a local pattern in stimulus history, such as a string of repetitions or alternations, compared to when it violates such a pattern. This is often the case even if the local trends arise by chance in the context of a randomized design, such that stimulus history has no predictive power. In this work, we use a normative Bayesian framework to examine the hypothesis that such idiosyncrasies may reflect the inadvertent engagement of fundamental mechanisms critical for adapting to changing statistics in the natural environment. We show that prior belief in non-stationarity can induce experimentally observed sequential effects in an otherwise Bayes-optimal algorithm. The Bayesian algorithm is shown to be well approximated by linear-exponential filtering of past observations, a feature also apparent in the behavioral data. We derive an explicit relationship between the parameters and computations of the exact Bayesian algorithm and those of the approximate linear-exponential filter. Since the latter is equivalent to a leaky-integration process, a commonly used model of neuronal dynamics underlying perceptual decision-making and trial-to-trial dependencies, our model provides a principled account of why such dynamics are useful. We also show that near-optimal tuning of the leaky-integration process is possible, using stochastic gradient descent based only on the noisy binary inputs. This is a proof of concept that not only can neurons implement near-optimal prediction based on standard neuronal dynamics, but that they can also learn to tune the processing parameters without explicitly representing probabilities.